Military Strategy - A General Theory of Power Control

The Classics of Sea Power series makes key works of professional naval
thought readily available in uniform, authoritative editions. Each book is
chosen for its eloquence, incisiveness, and pertinence to the great ideas of
naval theory, strategy, tactics, operations, and logistics. The series is a
companion to histories, anthologies, and other interpretative writings,
providing a depth of understanding that cannot be had from reading
secondary sources alone.
Rear Admiral J. C. Wylie was the first serving naval officer since Mahan
and Luce to become known for his writings on strategy and theory. Military
Strategy is a reaction to questions raised in the 1950s during the debate on
unification of the U.S. armed forces. In it Wylie attempts to break down
deep-seated service parochialism with a comprehensive approach to strategy.
Another of his purposes was to ensure that sea power and maritime
strategy were thoroughly appreciated. But Wylie also knew the limits of
navies, and was quick to say that sea power is always applied with an eye on
events ashore. Similarly, he was both appreciative and critical of air-power
and land-power advocates. He was ahead of his time in seeing that guerrilla
warfare was a fourth major element of strategic theory. Now, in a personal
postscript for this edition, he adds a fifth component, the strategy of
terrorism.
Wylie’s general theory of power, centered on the sturdy concept of
control as its end and developed with an original exposition of cumulative
and sequential strategies, is as useful today as when he wrote.